ABSTRACT Certificateless public key cryptography is a commonly adopted implementation system to solve problems of key-escrow and untrusted authority. Certificateless strong designated verifier signatures (CL-SDVSs) are special variations of digital signatures, since their authenticity can only be convinced by a designated verifier. To offer this functionality, most CL-SDVS mechanisms use shared secret key between a signer and a designated verifier. However, Shim points out that the leakage of common values will inevitably delegate signing capability to any third party. Furthermore, we notice that such protocols also cannot fulfill the notion of signer ambiguity if a signer's private key is compromised, and signatures have not been received by a designated verifier. In this paper, the author defines the first formal security model of strong signer ambiguity against key-compromise attacks (SSA-KCA) for CL-SDVS schemes. Then, a concrete construction satisfying not only the proposed SSA-KCA security, but also the essential existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) security against super-level adversaries is presented. We show that our construction is both non-delegatable and non-transferable. In addition, without using time-consuming bilinear pairings, the proposed scheme exhibits lower computational costs and shorter signature lengths when compared with previous works, which makes our protocol suitable for computationconstrained mobile devices in low-bandwidth Internet of Thing communication environments.
center (KGC) with a master secret key. Without the master secret key, it is computationally infeasible for any adversary to compute the valid private key from its known public identity. Thus, no additional public key certificate is required. Nevertheless, a malicious KGC possessing the knowledge of all users' private keys can easily impersonate any user, which is the key-escrow problem. Moreover, users cannot freely choose his/her own private keys.
For solving the key-escrow problem of ID-based systems and the certificate management of traditional public key systems, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] introduced the famous certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) based on bilinear pairing over elliptic curves. A major characteristic of this system is that each user's private key is co-determined by the KGC and users. Therefore, the KGC only has limited control over users' private keys. Yet, the bilinear pairing is a time-consuming operation. How to reduce the times of using bilinear pairing operation in designing cryptographic schemes implemented on CL-PKC has become an important issue.
In some practical application such as e-voting, signatures are not suitable for public verification, as only few persons have sufficient privileges to verify these special signatures. To deal with this requirement, Chaum and van Antwerpen [4] presented an undeniable signature scheme in which the signature verification process can only be carried out by a verifier and a signer together. That is to say, a signer has absolute control over who is able to verify his/her signatures. Nevertheless, undeniable signature schemes have an obvious drawback that a signer has to be involved in every signature verification process.
With a similar concept, Jakobsson et al. [5] presented the first designated verifier signature (DVS) scheme in which an original signer is unnecessary to cooperate with a designated verifier. Yet, only an intended verifier will believe the authenticity of given signatures, since DVS schemes further enable a designated verifier to create a computationally indistinguishable transcript designated for himself. We call such a property non-transferability or transcript simulation. Unfortunately, Wang [6] later indicated that their scheme is not secure.
In 2003, Saeednia et al. [7] addressed the notion of strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) scheme by incorporating a designated verifier's private key with the signature verification process. Consequently, only an intended verifier owning the corresponding private key can perform signature verification. Also, non-transferability is preserved in SDVS schemes. In 2009, however, Lee and Chang [8] pointed out that Saeednia et al.'s scheme cannot satisfy signer ambiguity if a signer's private key is compromised and the resulted SDVS has not been received by a designated verifier. The requirement of conventional signer ambiguity states that given an SDVS, it should be computationally infeasible for anyone to distinguish the real signer from a candidate signer and a designated verifier. The concept of strong signer ambiguity addressed by [8] focuses on those unverified SDVSs and further allows the adversary to gain the access of candidate signer's private key. Since then, the notion of strong signer ambiguity has become a crucial security requirement for designing a secure SDVS scheme. Still, there is no formally defined security model for this security notion so far.
Moreover, in 2014, Shim [9] highlighted the importance of non-delegatability for SDVS schemes. Specifically, without revealing the knowledge of private keys, neither a signer nor a designated verifier can delegate his/her signing power to any third party. He also demonstrated that DVS schemes relying on a common value such as Diffie-Hellman type value abP (g ab ) or bilinear Diffie-Hellman type value e(S a , Q b ) for generating and verifying an SDVS are all delegatable.
Motivated by the above-mentioned issues, in this paper, the author devotes himself to the design of pairing-free and nondelegatable certificateless SDVS (CL-SDVS) scheme which has provable strong signer ambiguity in formally defined security model.
A. RELATED WORKS
In 2004, Susilo et al. [10] elaborated on identity based systems to propose two ID-based SDVS schemes utilizing the assumption of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). They showed how to construct a generic SDVS scheme by integrating any ID-based signature scheme, encryption scheme and chameleon hash function. In 2007, Lee and Chang [11] provided SDVS with the property of message recovery to reduce transmission overheads. It allows a designated verifier to recover an original message from its SDVS. They claimed that their scheme has the same functionality as the signcrypted version of Saeednia et al.'s mechanism [7] , since no symmetric key encryption algorithm is employed in their design.
In 2009, Kang et al. [12] proposed a new ID-based SDVS scheme with short lengths. However, the literature [13] showed that their protocol could not withstand universal forgery attacks. Under the hardness of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), in 2011, Lin et al. [14] also gave an efficient SDVS scheme with short lengths. In 2014, Shim [9] demonstrated delegatability attacks on most DVS schemes and classified such schemes into three types according to the measure for generating/verifying a signature. He claimed that in a non-delegatable DVS scheme, neither a signer nor a designated verifier can delegate the signing power to any third party without leaking his/her private key.
Thinking of the benefits in CL-PKC, Huang et al. [15] introduced the first certificateless short designated verifier signature (CL-sDVS) scheme based on Gap DiffieHellman Problem (GDHP). Yet, their scheme must assume a trusted KGC. In 2007, Du and Wen [16] proposed a provably secure CL-sDVS scheme. Unfortunately, Fan et al. [17] pointed out that their scheme is vulnerable to public key replacement attacks. In 2008, Chen et al. [18] addressed a new CL-sDVS scheme using Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) and Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (GBDHP). They showed that their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. Nevertheless, the computational complexity of their mechanism is rather high.
In 2009, Du and Wen [19] came up with an efficient CL-SDVS scheme and further extended it into a certificateless strong designated verifier proxy signature (CL-SDVPS) scheme based on computational BDHP. Their scheme has better computational efficiency compared with Huang et al.'s [15] . Yet, their scheme is delegatable and vulnerable to key-compromise attacks. Later, Yang et al. [20] and Xiao et al. [21] separately gave new variants of CL-SDVS under the hardness of computational BDHP and CDHP.
In 2011, Choi et al. [22] proposed a new provable CL-sDVS scheme which was later proved insecure under public key replacement attacks by Tian et al. [23] . In 2013, Islam and Biswas [24] presented a provably secure CL-SDVS scheme using bilinear pairings. Nevertheless, their scheme could not satisfy the requirement of strong signer ambiguity under key-compromise attacks and is subjected to malicious KGC attacks. Without using bilinear pairings, He and Chen [25] proposed a new CL-SDVS scheme based on Elliptic Curve Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (ECCDHP). Their scheme earns superior computational efficiency compared with previous existing protocols. However, we find out that their scheme also fails to satisfy the strong signer ambiguity under key-compromise attacks.
Recently, Chen et al. [26] realized a non-delegatable CL-SDVS scheme which can resist two types of adversaries in certificateless systems. Still, they do not take into account the notion of strong signer ambiguity and lack related security proofs.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
The author considers the security problems for conventional SDVS schemes and further takes advantage of CL-PKC to propose a new construction of CL-SDVS scheme. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) The security model of strong signer ambiguity against key-compromise attacks (SSA-KCA) for CL-SDVS schemes is formally defined. 2) A new CL-SDVS construction satisfying both essential security properties and the proposed SSA-KCA security is also presented.
3)
The proposed CL-SDVS scheme belongs to Type-III DVS schemes of Shim's classifications [9] and thus is regarded as non-delegatable. 4) We show that our CL-SDVS scheme is pairing-fee and outperforms previous related mechanisms in terms of computational and communicational efficiency.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first review the mathematical backgrounds of elliptic curve systems and then describe underlying security problems and their computational assumptions. 
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE SYSTEMS
Let p be a large prime and F p a prime finite field. An elliptic curve E over the field F p , denoted by E/F p , can be defined as a set of points (x, y) satisfying the equality:
where a, b ∈ F p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the elliptic curve E: y 2 = x 3 − 4x + 0.67. There exists a special point O called the point at infinity. All points over E/F p along with the point O form a cyclic additive group G 1 of order q. We briefly state some characteristics of elliptic curve systems as follows:
1) The point O is the additive identity of the group operation.
2) The negative of a point is its reflection in the x-axis. 3) For each point Q over E/F p , the point −Q is also over E/F p . 4) There exists a base point P over E/F p . 5) A point multiplication ''qP'' means that the point P is repeatedly added to itself for q times. 6) If qP = O, the order of P is q. 7) For each point Q ∈ E/F p , we have
B. COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTION
This subsection reviews some intractable problems and their computational assumptions that would be used in construction of the proposed scheme.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem; ECDLP Given P, aP ∈ G 1 for some unknown a ∈ Z q , the ECDLP is to compute a.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) Assumption
The advantage for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A to solve the ECDLP is negligible.
Definition 1: The (t, ε)-ECDL assumption holds if there is no PPT adversary that can solve the ECDLP in time at most t and with an advantage ε.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem; CDHP Given P, aP, bP ∈ G 1 for some unknown a, b ∈ Z q , the CDHP is to compute abP ∈ G 1 .
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption
The advantage for all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A to solve the CDHP is negligible.
Definition 2: The (t, ε)-CDH assumption holds if there is no PPT adversary that can solve the CDHP in time at most t and with an advantage ε.
III. FORMAL MODEL OF CL-SDVS
In this section, we first describe the system model of a certificateless strong designated verifier signature (CL-SDVS) scheme and then state its essential algorithms. Additionally, the security model of a CL-SDVS scheme is also introduced for analyzing the security of our proposed scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
There are three main parties in a CL-SDVS scheme, including the key generation center (KGC), a signer and an intended verifier. The KGC equipped with a master private key is able to derive all users' partial private keys. Upon receiving the partial private key delivered from the KGC, each user can verify its validity and then setup his/her full private and public key pair. A signer can generate a CL-SDVS on a message for an intended verifier such that the resulted CL-SDVS can only be verified by the party with a correct private key.
B. ALGORITHMS
A CL-SDVS scheme is composed of eight algorithms described as follows:
-Setup: Taking as input a security parameter k, the algorithm generates system's public parameters . 
-CL-SDVS-Generation (CL-S-G):
The CL-S-G algorithm takes as input system parameters , a message m, a public key of designated verifier and a private key of signer. It generates a resulted CL-SDVS δ.
-
CL-SDVS-Verification (CL-S-V):
The CL-S-V algorithm takes as input system parameters , a message m, a CL-SDVS δ, a private key of designated verifier and a public key of signer. It outputs True if δ is a valid CL-SDVS for m. Otherwise, an error symbol ⊥ is returned as a result. -CL-SDVS-Simulation (CL-S-S): The CL-S-S algorithm takes as input system parameters , a message m, a CL-SDVS δ and a private key of designated verifier. It outputs another valid CL-SDVS δ * for m.
C. SECURITY MODEL
To prove the security of CL-SDVS schemes, we first describe basic security models of CL-PKC and give some security definitions in relation to the proposed construction. Generally speaking, in a certificateless signature scheme, three types of adversaries are considered to break the security requirement of unforgeability. 
has been submitted to any CL-S-V query.
2) ID * j has never been submitted to any SSV query.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
Following the algorithms defined in previous section, we present a concrete construction of CL-SDVS scheme. The used symbol notations are listed as Table 1 . Details of each algorithm are described below:
-Setup: On inputing a security parameter k, the KGC owning a master private key s first chooses a large prime p and an elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b over the field F p satisfying that 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0 where a, b ∈ F p . Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group consisting of the points on E/F p and a special point at infinity O. P is a base point of order q over G 1 and (H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ) are collision resistant hash functions defined as follows: 
Then the partial private key S i = (s i , q i , D i ) is returned back to the user via a secure channel. Each user can verify if 
-CL-SDVS-Generation (CL-S-G):
For generating a CL-SDVS on a chosen message m ∈ R {0, 1} * intended for U v , a signer U a selects w, r ∈ R Z * q to compute
The CL-SDVS on the message m is δ = (l, R, h) which will be sent to the designated verifier U v .
CL-SDVS-Verification (CL-S-V):
After receiving δ = (l, R, h), U v has to check whether the received δ is valid or not. To verify it, U v computes
If h = h, U v is convinced of the validity of δ. 
(by Eqs. (14), (15), (16)
(by Eqs. (13), (8), (12) 
(3). -CL-SDVS-Simulation (CL-S-S):
To simulate a computational indistinguishable CL-SDVS for a chosen message m , U v first chooses l ∈ Z * q and R ∈ R G 1 and then computes
Obviously, the simulated δ = (l , R , h ) would be a valid CL-SDVS on m .
V. SECURITY PROOF
We first analyze that our CL-SDVS scheme is nondelegatable and non-transferable and then describe detailed security proofs for our construction based on previously defined security models. 
, he still cannot forge a valid SDVS due to that a parameter l must be derived by the signer's private key x a . On the contrary, if the adversary first arbitrarily chooses l to compute W , he will face the problem of computing a valid V which is under the protection of designated verifier's private key x v . Therefore, we claim that the proposed CL-SDVS scheme is secure against the delegatability attacks.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: The proposed CL-SDVS scheme satisfies the essential security requirement of non-transferability.
Proof: The non-transferability is an essential property of any SDVS scheme, which prohibits a designated verifier to transfer his/her conviction to any third party. In the proposed scheme, the CL-S-S algorithm enables a designated verifier to simulate a computationally indistinguishable transcript intended for himself with his own private key. Consequently, the non-transferability requirement is fulfilled in the proposed scheme.
Theorem 3: The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable against Type-I adversaries if the intractability of ECDL and CDH assumptions holds.
Proof: Given only public parameters = {F p , E/F p , G 1 , q, P, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , P s } and two public keys PK a and PK v in relation to ID a and ID v , a Type-I adversary has to forge a valid CL-SDVS δ = (l, R, h). According to our scheme, however, a valid signature δ satisfies that
(by Eqs. (6), (7), (10) and (11)) It is obvious that a Type-I adversary must first obtian the secret value (x a , s a (D v + q v P s ), x a Y v ) before successfully making a valid forgery. Hence, our scheme is existentially unforgeable against Type-I adversaries under the hardness of ECDL and CDH assumptions.
Q.E.D. Theorem 4: The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existentially unforgeable against super-level Type-II and Type-III adversaries under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA) in the random oracle model if the hardness of CDH assumption holds.
Proof: Assume that a PPT super-level adversary A (either Type-II or Type-III) has non-negligible advantage ε to forge a valid CL-SDVS of our scheme. We will show that it is feasible to construct a PPT algorithm B to solve the CDHP instance of (P, cP, dP) by utilizing A as a sub program. The interactions between the adversary A and the challenger B are described below: Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm to obtain public parameters 
query, B replaces ID i 's full public key PK i with PK i . Note that only a Type-II adversary is allowed to make PKR queries.
CL-S-G queries: When
query where ID i = (ID * a , ID * v ), B first issues PPKE(ID i ) and SSV(ID i ) queries to obtain the private key (x i , S i ) and then computes a valid CL-SDVS δ according to our CL-S-G algorithm. In another case that if ID j = (ID * a , ID * v ), B can also obtain the private key (x j , S j ) by making PPKE(ID j ) and SSV(ID j ) queries and then derive a valid CL-SDVS δ by the CL-S-S algorithm.
CL-S-V queries: When
, B directly terminates. Otherwise, B first makes PPKE(ID j ) and SSV(ID j ) queries to obtain the private key (x j , S j ) and then performs the CL-S-V algorithm to verify δ. If it is valid, B outputs True; else, an error symbol ⊥ is returned. Forgery: At the end of this game, the adversary A will generate a forged CL-SDVS δ * for his chosen identities (ID * i , ID * j ) and message m * . By the initial assumption that A has non-negligible advantage to forge a valid CL-SDVS of the proposed scheme. If (
, we claim that the value Z * = r y (cdP) will be stored in some entry of the maintained H 2 _List. Specifically, let events E 1 to E 4 be defined as follows. E 1 : B does not abort for all CL-S-V queries. E 2 : A outputs a valid CL-SDVS δ * on m * for (ID * i , ID * j ).
E 4 : B outputs the correct value Z * = r y (cdP) from H 2 _List. Based on previous simulation, we can further derive
where q h , q k and q v are the maximum times of H 2 , SpuK and CL-S-V queries that A is allowed to invoke. Obviously, B's success probability can be written as
Therefore, B would have non-negligible advantage to solve the CDHP instance of (P, cP, dP) by computing cdP = (r y ) Proof: Let A be a PPT super-level Type-III adversary who has non-negligible advantage ε to break the SSA-KCA security of our scheme. By adopting A s advantage, we demonstrate how to build another PPT algorithm B for solving the CDHP instance of (P, cP, dP). The interactions between the adversary A and the challenger B are described below: Setup: B first runs the Setup(1 k ) algorithm to obtain public parameters A submits a CL-S-G(m, ID i , ID j ) query where ID i = ID * j , B could first invoke PPKE(ID i ) and SSV(ID i ) queries to obtain the private key (x i , S i ) and then compute a valid CL-SDVS δ according to our CL-S-G algorithm. Otherwise, B can also get the private key (x j , S j ) by invoking the PPKE(ID j ) and SSV(ID j ) queries and then derive a valid CL-SDVS δ by the CL-S-S algorithm.
CL-S-G queries: When

CL-S-V queries: When
query where ID j = ID * j , B first invokes PPKE(ID j ) and SSV(ID j ) queries to obtain the private key (x j , S j ) and then performs the CL-S-V algorithm to verify δ. 
The adversary A submits new queries and B responds as those simulated previously. Guess: A outputs a bit λ as the result. We say that A wins this game if
3) ID * j has never been submitted to any SSV query. Analysis of the game: According to our simulation, if A attempts to verify h * , it has to submit an H 2 (U * , R * , Z * , V * = (d + w)(cP)) query. Consequently, the value (d + w)(cP) would be stored in some entry of H 2 _List, which means that it is possible for B to output the correct answer cdP by computing V * −w(cP) where w is chosen by B. To evaluate B's success probability, we first define some events as follows. E 1 : B does not abort for all CL-S-V queries. E 2 : A outputs a bit λ satisfying that λ = λ. E 3 : B successfully outputs correct V * from H 2 _List.
From the above interactions between A and B, we have
where q h , q k and q v are the maximum times of H 2 , SpuK and CL-S-V queries that A can make. By combining these probability events, it can be learned that
which is B's success probability to solve the CDHP instance of (P, cP, dP). Since it is known that no efficient PPT algorithm can break CDHP, we thus conclude that under the SSA-KCA security, no super-level Type-III adversary against the proposed scheme exists. Q.E.D.
VI. EFFICIENCY AND COMPARISON
We evaluate the efficiency and security properties of our scheme with previous CL-SDVS mechanisms including [26] schemes. The security properties in terms of unforgeability against Type-I/II/III adversaries, strong signer ambiguity against key-compromise attacks (SSA-KCA) and non-delegatability are evaluated as Table 2 . From this table, it is apparent that only HC, CZXY and our schemes are nondelegatable, because the exposure of common secret will not delegate the signer's signing capability. However, we find out that HC scheme is obviously not SSA-KCA secure due to that their mechanism only relies on the shared secret key between a signer and a designated verifier. In both YHX and CZXY schemes, they adopted random numbers to encrypt signature parameters rather than using common secrets. By performing this step, any adversary owning the signer's full private keys still cannot verify a given signature. Hence, their schemes are said to fulfill the property of strong signer ambiguity. Nevertheless, due to lacking of related security notion or formal proofs, their schemes are only regarded as heuristically SSA-KCA secure. For facilitating computational and communicational comparisons, some utilized notations are first defined as Table 3 . The approximate running time for each operation is adopted from the experimental results of [28] which uses a Windows XP operating system and an Intel Pentium IV 3.0Ghz CPU with 512 MB ram. In order to achieve 1024-bit RSA security level, the Tate pairing defined over the supersingular elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + x with embedding degree 2 is employed for pairing-based schemes. P and q are separately 512-bit and 160-bit primes where q = 2 159 + 2 17 + 1. As for ECC-based mechanisms, a Koblitz elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax 2 + b defined over the field F 2163 with a = 1 and b a 163-bit random prime is utilized to obtain the same security level. Table 4 summarizes the detailed computational cost of CL-SDVS generation and verification for each compared scheme. The approximate running time is also illustrated as Figure 2 . We compare the communication performance in terms of signature lengths among all probabilistic CL-SDVS schemes [19] [20] [21] , [24] [25] [26] in Figure 3 .
As shown in the Figure 2 , IB scheme will take the longest time in generating a CL-SDVS while CSZS and HSMZ schemes take the longest time in verifying a CL-SDVS. Both HC scheme and ours do not use time-consuming bilinear pairing operation. Consequently, the running time for either generating or verifying a CL-SDVS is rather efficient as compared with others. Although HC scheme exhibits the best running time in both CL-SDVS generation and verification, their scheme fails to satisfy the proposed SSA-KCA security. In Figure 3 , it is evident that ours as well as HC scheme has shorter signature lengths compared to the others. As a whole, the proposed CL-SDVS scheme is still a better alternative for practical implementation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the author defined the first formal model of strong signer ambiguity against key-compromise attacks (SSA-KCA) for CL-SDVS schemes. A new construction without using bilinear pairing is also proposed. We proved that the proposed CL-SDVS scheme is both EUF-CMA and SSA-KCA secure in the random oracle model. The crucial properties such as non-delegatability and non-transferability are also preserved in our mechanism. The comparison of security properties clearly reveals that the proposed scheme has a higher security level when facing with various attacks. Besides, the efficiency evaluation supported that our new construction is superior than previous related mechanisms in either computational complexity or communication overheads. In summary, the proposed CL-SDVS scheme is more secure and suitable for computation-constrained mobile devices in low-bandwidth IoT communication environments.
